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Introduction 
 
The literature on International Relations has largely considered 
North America as a region formed by Canada and the United 
States, in spite of the fact that from the geographical 
perspective Mexico is also part of the region.  The 
acknowledgement of Mexico as part of North America is derived 
from the implementation of NAFTA and the attempt of scholars and 
decision makers to create a more efficient region.  The 
expectation of a North American Community was based on the 
assumption that increasing economic interdependence would 
stimulate the conception of regional institutions and eventually 
the spillover onto other areas of the trilateral agenda.  While 
the ideas of deeper regional cooperation floated in the air of 
the three countries, the analysis of regionalism in North 
America indicates that economic integration remains at the lower 
level of the Balasian integration (free trade) and the spillover 
effects have not taken place. In the area of security, threats 
to stability such as terrorism and organized crime have produced 
the reinforcement of the bi-lateralization rather than the tri-
lateralization. In this regard, this chapter explores the 
reasons why the North American partners are facing obstacles to 
develop deeper cooperation in the area of security from a 
regional perspective. By adopting a Wendtian approach, this 
chapter argues that in the area of security, a cooperative 
system has emerged in the US-Canadian relationship while the US-
Mexican relationship remains anchored in the logic of an 
individualistic system. The chapter starts with the overview of 
the theoretical approach to study security in North America, 
followed by the analysis of ideas, perceptions, principles and 
policies in the security of North America. 
 
The Fragmented Region: Individualistic and Cooperative Systems 
 
The study of security in North America has been explored from 
different theoretical perspectives derived from the study of 
security in Europe and the transatlantic community. Drawing on 
such approaches, North America has been defined as a pluralistic 
security community (Gonzalez and Haggard 1998) in the sense that 
in North America there are no prospects of conflicts escalating 
to the use of force among the three countries. From a different 
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angle, Bow (2010) has argued that to some extent North America 
has developed some features of a security complex as envisioned 
by Buzan, namely, a cluster of states which must take one 
another into account when thinking about their national 
security. While these approaches have contributed to the 
understanding of security in North America, they have provided a 
limited explanatory power due to the characteristics of the 
region; unlike the European Union or NATO, North America has 
opted for bilateral strategies to deal with threats and avoided 
trilateral institutions with collective decision-making power. 
This trend has been identified as dual-bilateralism (Pastor 
2008). 
 
As it will be developed below, the performance of the region 
reflects two different security systems. Based on the seminal 
conceptualization of Alexander Wendt (1992) on security systems, 
security differs “in the extent to which and the manner in which 
the self is identified cognitively with the other,” paving the 
way to competitive, individualistic and cooperative systems. Two 
systems prevail in North America. By adapting the model of 
Wendt, the cooperation between the United States and Canada 
resembles the cooperative security system in which states 
identify positively with one another and the parties are able to 
share and build common institutions, and security of each is 
perceived as the responsibility of all. On the other hand, the 
security relationship between the United States and Mexico as 
well as Canada and Mexico is guided by the rationale of an 
individualist security system, in which states are ambiguous in 
the identification with one another, cooperation is limited as a 
result of distrust and security is perceived as an individual 
responsibility. The remainder of the paper will address why the 
three countries have prioritized bilateral cooperation rather 
than regional cooperation by looking at perceptions, principles 
and policies in the area of security cooperation. The argument 
is that, following Wendt, countries can change and form a 
security system when a transformative process occurs on three 
different levels: breakdown of consensus, critical examination 
and new practices. In North America, there is no evidence of 
breakdown of consensus of the status quo of the security system 
at the trilateral level, neither between the US or Canada with 
Mexico, while Canada and the United States were able to develop 
a cooperative system during the Cold War. These ideas will be 
explored below. 
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Ideas and Perceptions 
 
Several scholars have argued that ideas are fundamental to 
change the orientation of security institutions (Ned Lebow and 
Groos Stein 1994; Wendt 1991). The idea for a security community 
for North America has been posed to the regional audience in a 
wave that lasted from mid-1990s to 2005-6. While think tanks and 
scholars embraced the viability of the regional community, the 
governments and elites responded cautiously and 
unenthusiastically. All in all, the debate in North America has 
paved the way to the creation of two groups based on the scope 
of the regional community from a minimalist approach, namely, 
proposing a superficial adaptation of NAFTA limited to the 
United States and Canada, to a maximalist mode suggesting a 
European Union like entity, or a combination of both (Dominguez 
2005, 28). 
 
A) Ideas for a North American Community 
 
In Mexico, for many years, the idea of a North American 
community was rejected due to the economic disparities between 
Mexico and the United States and the nationalistic approach of 
the Mexican foreign policy. In the 1970s, the US government put 
forward the idea of a North America Common Market; but the 
Mexican government and the society discarded the proposal since 
Mexico was embarked in an import-substitution model and was not 
interested in an open market. However, the idea toward an 
economic integration with the United States was shaped after the 
financial crisis at the beginning of the 1980s. Then, the 
Mexican government was willing to open up foreign trade to 
reduce the effects of the crisis and promote economic 
development. The Carlos Salinas administration (1988-1994) then 
accepted the idea of economic integration with North America and 
signed NAFTA in 1992. As can be seen, Mexico was willing to 
create a North American community but only in trade and 
financial terms. The idea of a North American community in 
security matters was not considered due to the nationalistic 
approach of Mexican foreign policy and the Mexican governments 
distrust towards US authorities.1 In the economic sphere, some 
authors have proposed the development of a North American Common 
Market that can include free movement of people, goods, 
                                                            
1 In Mexico, both government and society distrust U.S. authorities because 
they consider that, in some occasions, Washington has meddled in Mexico’s 
domestic affairs in security matters.  
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investments and services (Flores and Novelo, 2010), but ideas of 
a security community in the region are unusual.  
 
When President Vicente Fox came to power in 2000, he was willing 
to deepen the North America integration process to include free 
movement of people and the creation of development funds, as it 
has been done in the European Union. But security was not 
included in the package. The Fox administration also put forward 
an immigration agreement between Mexico and the US to regulate 
the legal status of Mexican migrants. This proposal was known as 
the NAFTA-plus. However, the idea did not reverberate in the 
United States and Canada. After the 9-11 attacks, Vicente Fox 
was disposed to cooperate with the United States in its war 
against international terrorism. But he did not support 
President Bush in his initiative to launch a United Nations (UN) 
attack to Iraq in 2003. By that time, Mexico was part of the UN 
Security Council, and was not willing to vote in favor of the 
attack due to the Mexican foreign policy tenets (Non 
Intervention and Peaceful Resolution on International 
Controversies) and because the mid-term federal elections were 
too close. Vicente Fox and his rightist party would have lost 
votes if he backed up the US intervention in Iraq. This position 
brought resentment in the Bush administration against Mexico and 
hampered the possibilities of the construction of a security 
community after 9-11. However, the bilateral differences were 
resolved in 2005 when Mexico, the United States and Canada 
signed the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) to 
guarantee security cooperation in North America. But the SPP 
failed due to the lack of interests and incentives when new 
administrations came into power in Mexico and the United States. 
President Barack Obama did not show too much interest in the SPP 
and President Felipe Calderon did not have among his priorities 
the creation of a security community in North America. 
Calderon’s interests focused on the war against drug trafficking 
and organized crime and he preferred a bilateral approach 
through the Merida Initiative, which is a mechanism between 
Mexico and the United States to cooperate in those issues. 
Therefore, the idea of a trilateral security community has not 
been well developed in Mexico in the last years. 
 
In Canada, the debate on the future of North America was 
triggered by the Big Idea, which was proposed by Wendy Dobson 
(2002). She argues that Canada and Mexico should facilitate U.S 
security goals, and in return the United States should commit to 
maintaining open borders even in the aftermath of an attack. 
Specifically, she recommends the consideration of a “strategic 
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bargain,” a “pragmatic mix of customs-union-like and common 
market-like proposals plus Canadian initiatives” in areas of 
strength that are of particular interests for Americans. In the 
case of the U.S.-Canadian security relationship, Dobson proposed 
the following: a) investing in the border in order to have a 
more secure border with fewer obstacles; b) mutual recognition 
of the security of immigration from third countries; c) energy 
as part of bilateral security; and d) more active role for 
Canada on bilateral military defense. Likewise, she suggests 
Canadians should proceed bilaterally but be open to including 
Mexico when it makes sense. Contrary to Dobson, Charles Barnett 
and Hugh Williams (2003) rejected the Big Idea approach. They 
suggest that engaging in high-profile bilateral negotiations may 
well be a disadvantage for the weaker state, Canada. They urge 
bilateral process where the issues are addressed in an 
incremental and pragmatic manner. In this regard, they summarize 
their approach by focusing on the following areas: a) expanding 
successful approaches, such as the Smart Border Declaration; b) 
encouraging security cooperation; c) working towards a common 
external tariff; and d) identifying mutual interest in 
international trade negotiations. Along the same lines, in 2003 
the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE) presented a 
strategy for advancing the Canadian-United States relationship. 
This strategy, entitled “Security and Prosperity: The Dynamics 
of a New Canada-United States Partnership in North America” or 
“Treaty of North America,” is based on five interlocking 
pillars: reinventing the border; maximizing economic 
efficiencies; building on resource security; sharing in 
continental and global security; and developing new institutions 
for managing the bilateral relationship (d’Aquino 2003). 
 
Contrary to minimalist approaches to integration in North 
America, in a very comprehensive proposal, Robert Pastor (2001) 
presents the North American Community. Considering the pros and 
cons of European integration, the North American Community would 
emphasize institutional development at the regional level as 
well as the creation of compensatory mechanisms to reduce the 
gap between Mexico and its two NAFTA partners. In this regard, 
three institutions could be created. Unlike the European 
Commission, a North American Commission should be “lean and 
advisory, made up of just 15 distinguished individuals, five 
from each country.” Likewise, a single North American Inter-
Parliamentary Group would merge the bilateral inter-
parliamentary groups with a problem solving approach. The third 
institution would be a Permanent Court on Trade and Investment, 
which would “permit the accumulation of precedent.” Along with 
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these institutions, a North American Customs Union and a North 
American Customs and Immigration Force would contribute to 
enhance trade exchanges and security. Perhaps one of the most 
important features of this proposal is the North American 
Investment Fund that would invest $200 billion in infrastructure 
over the next decade on the condition that Mexico increases its 
tax revenues from 11 to 16 percent of its GDP. 
 
B) Perceptions of Threats 
 
Perceptions of threats are one of the main variables that form 
security policies. The information available from the public 
opinion surveys of the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations from 
2004 to 2010 indicates that two threats have been permanently 
ranked among the five top places within the United States: 
international terrorism and the possibility of unfriendly 
countries becoming nuclear powers. The US dependence on foreign 
oil/disruption of energy supply was ranked among the top five 
priorities in 2006, 2008 and 2010, while violent Islamist groups 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan was salient in 2008 and 2010 and 
Iran’s nuclear program was included as the third threat in 2010. 
 
While the main perceptions of threats in the United States stem 
from global sources and hence reflect the global role of the 
United States, two critical threats related to the North 
American region and more precisely to Mexico have also been 
included in the survey: drug-related violence and instability in 
Mexico was ranked eleventh in 2010 and large numbers of 
immigrants and refugees coming into the US was ranked fifth in 
2004, fourth in 2006 and sixth in 2008.  
 
In the case of Mexico, according to the “Mexico, the Americas, 
and the World 2010” survey, the main threats for national 
security are drug-trafficking and organized crime, which ranked 
as the number 1 threat in 2010, with 82% of respondents 
identifying them as a ‘grave threat’ (Gonzalez, 2011, p. 59). 
This perception has been consistent over the four editions of 
the survey (2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010): In 2004, ‘Drug 
Trafficking’ was ranked as the number 1 threat (89%); in 2006, 
‘Drug Trafficking’ was once again ranked number 1 (93%); in 
2008, ‘Drug-trafficking and organized crime’ was ranked number 1 
(79%). Therefore, Mexicans perceive domestic issues as the 
greatest threats rather than global problems. Thus, Mexicans are 
more concerned over issues that affect daily life. As for global 
menaces, Mexicans rank weapons trafficking (76% - rank 5 in 
2010), nuclear weapons (72% - rank 8 in 2010) and international 
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terrorism (72% - rank 8 in 2010) as an intermediate threat. In a 
regional context, Mexicans are less worried about border 
conflicts (rank 11 in 2010), territorial disputes (rank 11 in 
2010), and instability in neighboring countries (rank 12 in 
2010). 
 
In the case of Canada, five issues have been the most important 
during the period 1993-2010. In 2010 the ranking was the 
following: environment (16%); starvation (16%); war (14%); 
economy (14%); and terrorism (6%). (Environics Institute 2010). 
According to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 
public perceptions have changed greatly regarding threats to the 
vital interests of Canada. “Climate change now dominates the 
agenda, while terrorism and potential epidemics have almost 
disappeared from Canadians’ radar screen” (Canadian Defence and 
Foreign Affairs Institute, 2010). Roughly 50% of Canadians deem 
that climate change is a critical threat to the vital interests 
of the country in the next 10 years (49% in 2010 vs. 52% in 
2004). Therefore, climate change has become the most important 
threat in the views of Canadians. On the other hand, almost a 
quarter of Canadian public (28% in 2010 vs. 49% in 2004) now 
consider international terrorism as a vital threat, which 
represents a figure below the one registered in 2004. In the 
case of migration, the concern over the number of immigrants and 
refugees has grown since 2004 (27% in 2010 vs. 21% in 2004).  
 
As it can be observed, there is a significant difference in 
perceptions among the three countries in North America: Mexicans 
perceived organized crime as the main threat, the United States 
reflects its threats as result of their global role, while 
Canadians are focused on more soft security issues, such as 
climate change. This difference in perceptions makes it more 
difficult to construct a security community in the North 
American region. The United States government and society are 
more interested in international terrorism and global threats. 
Therefore, they would push for deeper security schemes in the 
region. Mexico and Canada would resist creating a security 
community based exclusively in global “hard” security issues and 
would press to include “soft” and local security issues, such as 
organized crime and climate change. A trilateral negotiation 
among the three countries would be highly difficult and to reach 
a consensus on security issues in the region would be equally 
complicated. 
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Principles of action 
  
The perceptions of security priorities in the three countries 
correspond to the principles enacted in the guiding documents on 
security.  In the case of the United States, the evaluation of 
the US strategies towards Mexico and Canada entail two distinct 
approaches. The 2010 National Security Strategy identifies 
weapons of mass destruction and far-reaching networks of hatred 
and violence, and hence terrorism, as the main threats for the 
United States. While the NSC identifies North America as a 
region and advocates to “change the way we think about our 
shared borders, in order to secure and expedite the lawful and 
legitimate flow of people and goods while interdicting 
transnational threat that threaten our open societies” (47), the 
document continues and differentiates the approach of security 
to both neighboring countries: “With Canada, our security 
cooperation includes our defense of North America and our 
efforts through NATO overseas… With Mexico, in addition to trade 
cooperation, we are working together to identify and interdict 
threats at the earliest opportunity, even before they reach 
North America. Stability and security in Mexico are 
indispensable to building a strong economic partnership, 
fighting the illicit drug and arms trade, and promoting sound 
immigration policy” (White House 2010, 47). 
 
Another fundamental document that enshrines the differentiation 
of Mexico and Canada in the perspective of the United States is 
the 2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: 
Addressing Converging Threats to National Security.  While there 
are no specific references to North America, Canada is mentioned 
within the actions of sharing of criminal intelligence and 
enhanced cooperation with groups such as the “Quintet of 
Attorneys-General” and the “Strategic Alliance Group” 
established with the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and 
Australia. However, the approach to Mexico is quite different. 
First and foremost, the document underscores the historic 
campaign of the Mexican Government against transnational crime 
organizations. Later, the Strategy acknowledges that indeed the 
demand for illicit drugs, both in the United States and abroad, 
fuels the power, impunity, and violence of criminal 
organizations around the globe and that Mexican DTOs are 
escalating their violence to consolidate their market share 
within the Western Hemisphere, protect their operations in 
Mexico, and expand their reach into the United States. It also 
describes the links between criminal networks and illicit arms 
dealers and the fact that the US Federal law enforcement 
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agencies have intercepted large numbers of weapons or related 
items being smuggled to China, Russia, Mexico, the Philippines, 
Somalia, Turkmenistan, and Yemen in 2010 alone. Finally, the 
document states that TOC in Mexico makes the U.S. border more 
vulnerable because it creates and maintains illicit corridors 
for border crossings that can be employed by other secondary 
criminal or terrorist actors or organizations. 
 
In a review of the Mexican national security strategies, there 
are two important official documents: The Plan Nacional de 
Desarrollo (National Development Plan [NDP]) and the Programa 
Nacional de Seguridad Pública 2008-2012 (National Program of 
Public Security 2008-2012 [NPPS]). In this case, the government 
strategy also corresponds to the perception of the Mexican 
public opinion. That is, Mexican authorities focuses on domestic 
issues rather than regional or global matters. Both the NDP and 
the NPPS have a nationalistic perspective. For example, the NPPS 
does not even mention the region of North America, nor the 
United States or Canada. According to this document, Mexico’s 
national security policy is based on the following goals: to 
prevent criminal activities, to openly combat crime, to 
consolidate the rule of law, to improve technology to fight 
against organized crime, to professionalize police corporations, 
and to reform the institutions in charge in combating crime. The 
NDP emphasizes the same goals, but it includes international 
cooperation in the security policy. The document establishes 
that the Mexican government has to promote international 
cooperation to face organized crime, but this has to be carried 
out under the principles of “defense of sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and legal equality of States.” The NDP neither refers 
to North America as a region, nor does it establish particular 
strategies towards Canada or the United States. Therefore, the 
NDP does not consider Mexico as part of the North American 
region. It only mentions the northern neighbor when setting 
goals and strategies on border matters, particularly in the 
exchange of information for border security. As can be seen, 
Mexico’s policy against potential threats is based on a local 
vision and does not emphasize regional cooperation. 
 
In the case of Canada, a report titled Securing an Open Society: 
Canada's National Security Policy was released in 2004 and 
served as the “first-ever policy of its kind” (Public Safety 
Canada 2011) to outline Canada’s core national security 
interests and design a plan to face the security threats deemed 
most serious. The report was reassessed in 2005 through the 
publishing of Securing an Open Society: One Year Later, where 
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the government of Canada reinforced the notion that the 
country’s security policy revolves around three core interests: 
protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians; 
ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to its allies; and 
contributing to international security (Privy Council Office 
2004). 
 
The report, which enshrines Canada’s National Security Policy, 
has focused on six key areas: intelligence, emergency planning, 
public health emergencies, transportation security, border 
security and international security. While the first four of 
these priorities are of a mostly domestic nature, border 
security and international security are priorities that relate 
to Canada’s role in the regional and international arena. With 
regards to border security, the Canadian government highlights 
the importance of Canada-US border programs, such as the Smart 
Border Declaration and the Free and Secure Trade program (FAST). 
The report expresses the country’s interest in developing a 
next-generation borders agenda with both Mexico and the US, 
building on the success of the Smart Border Declaration. 
Conversely, Canada shies away from its regional neighbors in the 
international security arena, where it highlights its 
participation in the UN and NATO. Regarding international 
security, the highest priority is placed on three key points: 
international terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction; and failed and failing states and intra- and 
interstate conflict. In its 2005 update report, Canada named as 
one of its priorities the revitalization of its North American 
partnership with Mexico and the United States “by enhancing 
security and promoting prosperity” (Privy Council Office 2005, 
48). It set out to work together to establish “a common approach 
to security to protect North America from external threats, 
prevent and respond to threats within North America, and further 
streamline the secure and efficient movement of legitimate, low-
risk traffic across our shared borders” (49). 
 
Policies 
 
Perceptions and principles aim to be transformed into policies 
that influence the behavior of the actors. The security policies 
of cooperation have been focused on two main areas: military and 
border policies. 
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A) United States-Canada 
 
Security military cooperation between the United States and 
Canada can be traced back to the North American Aerospace 
Defense Command (NORAD) in 1957, which is located in Colorado 
Springs. The NORAD commander is chosen by and is responsible to 
the Canadian Prime Minister and the US President.  As a result 
of the 9-11 attacks, NORAD was incorporated in the US Northern 
Command (NORTHCOM) mission to dissuade, prevent and confront 
threats directed to the United States. The cooperation between 
NORAD and NORTHCOM has in fact provided the incentives for 
closer military cooperation between both countries to protect 
not only the air, but also the coastal and territorial space 
(Hristoulas 2010). Canada also deployed military presence in 
Afghanistan alongside the US and other NATO troops.  
 
With regard to border cooperation, after the 9/11 events, the 
United States and Canada negotiated a formula to maintain the 
intensive trade exchange and also to protect the border. On 12 
December 2001, both countries signed the 32-point Smart Border 
Declaration. The cooperation has evolved in a more constructive 
way and both countries created the Integrated Border Enforcement 
Team (IBET), which consists of the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police, the Canada Border Services Agency, the US Border Patrol, 
the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the US Coast 
Guard. As of February 2012, there were 24 IBET units that play a 
critical role in maintaining the integrity and security of 
bilateral borders by assisting in national security 
investigations and combating organized crime and other criminal 
activity. On several occasions, the RCMP and the US Coast Guard 
have collaborated on a special marine security project known as 
“Shiprider,” targeting cross-border criminal activity on our 
shared waters. The Shiprider pilots were a tremendous success 
and negotiations are underway to create a permanent Shiprider 
program (RCMP 2010) 
 
B) United States-Mexico 
 
In the case of military cooperation between Mexico and the 
United States, the former has been quite reluctant to cooperate 
in order to preserve national sovereignty.  The Merida 
Initiative (MI) was a turning point, because for the first time 
the US provided military and police assistance to Mexico. The MI 
represents a symbolic mechanism in U.S. -Mexican cooperation 
against criminal organizations. In qualitative terms, MI implies 
a change of perception in the bilateral relationship. On one 
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hand, the US government acknowledges that the US has a co-
responsibility in the violence that has spurred in Mexico due to 
the high levels of drug consumption in the United States. On the 
other hand, Mexican government also recognizes that the country 
needs the help of its northern neighbor to fight against 
organized crime. Thirty years ago, it would be difficult for the 
Mexican government to resort to US help in security matters. In 
quantitative terms, MI does not represent a significant amount 
of cash since the U.S. government only compromises 1.2 billion 
dollars for three years (2007-2010). This amount is low compared 
to Mexican needs. However, the MI is an important advancement in 
terms of bilateral cooperation, but not in a regional 
perspective since Canada is not included.  
 
Despite the progress made by the MI, some US authorities do not 
trust Mexican peers due to the high levels of corruption in 
Mexican police institutions. The distrust has triggered two 
realities. First of all, it is very difficult to construct a 
regional security community when there is this level of 
distrust. Secondly, the US government has also implemented 
cautious and unilateral policies towards Mexico in security 
matters. For example, the US government carried out unilateral 
operations such as “Casa Blanca” in 1998 and recently “Fast and 
Furious.” The latter was a covert operation to identify Mexican 
bank authorities that were involved in the laundering of money 
coming from drug cartels. The US government imprisoned several 
Mexicans and the Mexican government protested, arguing that the 
sovereignty had been violated because the US authorities did not 
inform Mexico about the operation. Casa Blanca also brought 
distrust of Mexican officials to cooperate with the United 
States in security matters. “Fast and Furious” was also a covert 
operation in which U.S. authorities smuggled weapons into 
Mexican territory to identify organizations that were selling 
arms illegally. Again, the US did not inform Mexico about the 
operation and there was protest for the unilateral actions. 
 
In the case of border cooperation between the US and Mexico, on 
22 March 2002 both countries signed the Border Partnership. In 
2006, amidst rising crime on the Southwest border, ICE and CBP 
worked with other Federal, State, local, and foreign partners to 
establish the Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST), 
designed to attack TOC networks that exploit our borders and 
threaten the American public. Since then, this initiative has 
grown to 21 BESTs arrayed along the Southwest and Northern 
borders as well as at major seaports. These BESTs have seized 
more than 36,000 pounds of cocaine, 550 pounds of heroin, 
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485,000 pounds of marijuana, 4,300 weapons, $68 million, and led 
to the arrests of 5,910 individuals.  The U.S.-Mexico 21st 
Century Border Action Plan agreements on law enforcement 
cooperation still seek to finalize it.  
 
C) Mexico-Canada 
 
A number of authors have argued that there is not a trilateral 
relationship in terms of security matters in North America 
(Gabriel and Macdonald, 2007, Andreas 2003, Hristoulas, and 
Roussel 2007, Clarkson, 2007). They argue that there are two 
bilateral relationships: Canada and the United States and the 
United States and Mexico. In both cases, Washington exerts 
pressure over Mexico and Canada so its security interests 
prevail in both bilateral relationships. Therefore, it is 
difficult to construct a real regional security community due to 
the two bilateral relationships.  
 
Indeed, there are few bilateral actions between Mexico and 
Canada in security issues. Before NAFTA was implemented, 
security relations between Mexico and Canada were marginal. 
There were some differences due to the nationalistic views of 
each country (Benitez and Hristoulas 2012). However, after 
NAFTA, Canada and Mexico were open to widening their ties in 
several issues, including security. After the 9-11 events, both 
countries were willing to cooperate with the United States in 
its efforts against international terrorism. However, Mexico and 
Canada opposed to backing up the United States in 2003 in the 
United Nations when Washington was trying to form an 
international coalition to attack Iraq. Both Mexico and Canada 
projected national foreign policies in this topic. The 
reluctance of Mexico and Canada in the United Nations is also a 
sign that nationalistic views impede the construction of a 
security community in North America. 
 
After 9-11 and in the light of the violence in Mexico, Canada 
and Mexico have established some forms of cooperation in the 
fight against crime organization. For Canada, the violence 
derived from drug trafficking and the supply of drugs represent 
a threat for national security. Therefore, Canada has imple-
mented with Mexico programs to exchange information in this 
topic and to train police forces (Morden, 2012). However, Canada 
implemented in 2009 a visa program for Mexicans who travel to 
Canada. The measure hurt the bilateral relationship and 
obstructed widened security cooperation between Mexico and 
Canada. This nationalistic vision of Canada has also impeded a 
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deeper integration for a trilateral security community in North 
America. 
 
D) Trilateral 
 
At the trilateral level, the three countries signed the Security 
and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) in 2005. However, by early 
2012, there was a consensus that the SPP failed to deliver 
specific policies due to the lack of interests and incentives to 
develop a broader scheme (Hristoulas 2010). While the SPP 
developed working groups in the area of prosperity, the area of 
security was practically absent. There was also strong criticism 
in the three countries against the SPP. In Canada, the right 
wing New Democrats party censured openly the SPP since they 
considered it as a liberal initiative that attacked Canada’s 
sovereignty. They claimed that it was their victory when, in 
August 2009, the SPP website was updated to say: “The Security 
and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) is no longer 
an active initiative.” (NDP, 2009). In the US, there is also a 
conservative movement that opposed further integration with 
Mexico at all levels. For example, they deem that illegal 
migrants represent a threat to US national security. Therefore, 
they would oppose to a deeper integration that includes the free 
movement of people in the region. In Mexico, there are also 
nationalistic and leftist groups that are against a broader 
integration with the United States because they consider the US 
to be violating Mexico’s sovereignty regarding security issues.  
 
The change in the presidential administrations in the United 
States and in Mexico was also a factor that explains the failure 
of SPP. When Barack Obama came into power, there was little 
interest in Washington to deepen SPP. Due to the economic crisis 
that stemmed in the US, Obama focused his attention in the 
domestic economy and a deeper integration with Mexico and Canada 
was put on the back burner. In Mexico, there was also a change 
of presidential administration. President Felipe Calderon put 
little interest in the partnership as well. At the beginning of 
his government, he was very cautious towards the United States. 
For example, he “de-migrated” the bilateral agenda since 
previously, Fox had emphasized the migrant agreement. Besides, 
Calderon did not travel officially to the US in his first year 
of administration (Fox had several meetings with Bush in his 
first year) and canceled the Binational Commission, a high level 
cabinet mechanism to address key issues in the bilateral agenda. 
Based on Calderon´s suggestion, Washington changed the US 
Ambassador to Mexico in 2011, arguing that he did not trust the 
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one in charge. These actions reflect some kind of anti-US 
feeling from President Calderon; but he also projected a 
pragmatic view towards the US. Calderon was more interested in 
the Merida Initiative because it would provide funds to his 
number one priority; the war against organized crime. Calderon’s 
personal perceptions towards the US also buried SPP. 
 
The failure of SPP is an example of the difficulty in creating a 
trilateral security community in North America. As can be seen, 
there are not enough incentives in the three countries to 
develop a deeper integration in the region in security matters. 
There are more obstacles to reach this goal, such as opposition 
in conservative and nationalistic sectors and mutual distrust, 
particularly between Mexico and the United States. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Due to different ideas, perceptions, principles of actions, and 
policy in the three countries, a security community in North 
America is difficult to construct. Up to now, we can say that 
there are two security communities in the region: Canada-United 
States and Mexico-United States. The first one has been more 
developed, but the second one has several obstacles. 
Conservative standpoints in the US political system and the 
distrust that the US government has in Mexican institutions that 
are in charge of security issues will stand as major obstacles 
for the construction of a broader cooperation scheme between the 
US and Mexico. On the other hand, a nationalistic Mexican 
foreign policy stand and the Mexican distrust against the US 
authorities will also obstruct the creation of a security 
community in the near future. Therefore, a trilateral system 
would be very difficult to reach.  
 
It is important that the three countries increase security 
cooperation since all threats affect the three countries. They 
need to overcome differences in ideas and perceptions and work 
more coordinately to address mutual problems. For the sake of 
the three societies, each government needs to cooperate in a 
mandatory way. However, in the near future we will not see a 
well-shaped security community in North America. It is very 
likely that integration will continue to focus on trade and 
financial topics, and other topics, such as migration, will not 
be included in the regional agenda. 
Roberto Domínguez and Rafael Velázquez 
16 
 
References 
 
Andreas, Peter. 2003. “A Tale of Two Borders: The U.S.-Mexico 
and U.S.-Canada Lines After 9-11.” In The Rebordering of 
North America: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security 
Context, ed. Peter Andreas and Thomas Biersteker. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Barnett, Charles and Hugh Williams. 2003. “Renewing the 
Relationship: Canada and the United States in the 21st 
Century,” Conference Board Briefing. February. 
 
Benitez, Raul, and Athanasios Hristoulas. 2012. “México y 
Canadá: El reto de enfrentarse al crimen organizado.” In 
Canadá y México: La Agenda Pendiente, ed. Alex Bugailiskis 
and Andrés Rozental. Toronto: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 227-238. 
 
Bow, Brian. 2010. “North America as an Emergent Regional 
Security Complex.” Presented at the International Studies 
Association, New Orleans, February 19-20. 
 
Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute. 2010. Threat 
perceptions in Canada, available in: http://www.cdfai.org/ 
PDF/Poll%20on%20Threat%20Perceptions%20in%20Canada.pdf 
 
Caplig, Ann and Kim Richard Nossal. 2009. “The Contradictions of 
regionalism in North America.” Review of International 
Studies 35: 147-167. 
 
Castro-Rea, Julián. 2009. “North American Politics after 
September 11: Security, Democracy and Sovereignty.” In 
Contentious Politics in North America: National Protest and 
Transnational Collaboration under Continental Integration, 
ed. Jeffrey Ayres and Laura MacDonald. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Clarkson, Stephen, and Antonio Torres-Ruiz. 2009. “The 
Globalized Complexities of Transborder Governance in North 
America.” In Contentious Politics in North America: 
National Protest and Transnational Collaboration under 
Continental Integration, ed. Jeffrey Ayres and Laura 
MacDonald. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Roberto Domínguez and Rafael Velázquez 
17 
 
Clarkson, Stephen. 2007. “Does North America Exist? Transborder 
Governance after NAFTA and the Security and Prosperity 
Partnership.” Norteamérica 2 (2): 85-104. 
 
d’Aquino, Thomas. 2003. “Security and Prosperity. The Dynamics 
of a New Canada-United States Partnership in North 
America.” Presentation to the Annual General Meeting of the 
Canadian Council of Chief Executives, Toronto, January. 
 
Dobson, Wendy. 2002. “Shaping the Future of the North American 
Economic Space: A Framework for Action,” Commentary: The 
Border Papers, no. 162, April 2002. 
 
Dominguez, Roberto. 2005. “NAFTA: Assessments and Institutional 
Development.” In The European Union and Regional 
Integration A Comparative Perspective and Lessons for the 
Americas, ed. Joaquín Roy and Roberto Domínguez. Miami: 
Jean Monnet Chair University of Miami European Commission. 
 
Environics Institute. 2010. Focus Canada. Available at 
http://www.environicsinstitute.org/research-
focuscanada2010.html. Accessed January 12, 2012.  
 
Flores Salgado, José and Federico Novelo Urdanivia. 2010. “Hacia 
el mercado común norteamericano”, in Análisis Económico, N. 
58, vol. XXV, pp. 185-207. 
 
Gabriel, Christina, and Laura MacDonald. 2005. “From the 49th 
Parallel to the Río Grande: U.S. Homeland Security and 
North American Borders.” In North American Politics: 
Globalization and Culture, ed. Yasmeen Abu-Laban, Radha 
Jhappan and Francois Rocher. Peterborough: Broadview, 353-
370. 
 
Gonzalez, Guadalupe, and Stephan Haggard. 1998. "The United 
States and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community." In 
Security Communities, ed. Emanuel Adler. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
González, Guadalupe, Schiavon, Jorge A., Crow, David, and 
Gerardo Maldonado. 2011. “Mexico, the Americas, and the 
World 2010. Foreign Policy: Public Opinion and Leaders.” 
Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas. 
http://mexicoyelmundo.cide.edu/2010/reporteingles10.pdf 
(February 20, 2012). 
 
Roberto Domínguez and Rafael Velázquez 
18 
 
Hristoulas, Athanasios, and Stephane Roussel. 2007.  “North 
America Security and Foreign Policy. Does a Trilateral 
Community Exist?” In North American Politics: Globalization 
and Culture, ed. Yasmeen Abu-Laban, Radha Jhappan and 
Francois Rocher. Peterborough: Broadview, 371-388. 
 
Hristoulas, Athanasios. 2010. “Whatever happened to the North 
America Security Perimeter.” Presented at the International 
Studies Association, New Orleans, February 19-20. 
 
Morden, Reid. 2012. “Seguridad hemisférica: El dilema Canadá-
México In Canadá y México: La Agenda Pendiente, ed. Alex 
Bugailiskis and Andrés Rozental . Toronto: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 219-226. 
 
NDP. 2009. “New Democrats celebrates victory over SPP”, 
http://www.ndp.ca/press/new-democrats-celebrates-victory-
over-spp 
 
Ned Lebow, Richard and Janice Gross Stein. 1994. We All Lost the 
Cold War. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Pastor, Robert. 2008. “Beyond NAFTA: The Emergence and Future of 
North America.” In Politics of North America: Redefining 
Continental relations, ed. Yasmeen Abu-Laban, Radha Jhappan 
and Fancois Rocher. Peterborough: Broadview Press. 
 
Pastor, Robert. 2001. Toward a North American Community: Lessons 
from the Old Word to the New. Washington D.C.: Institute 
for International Economics, 2001. 
 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police. 2010. “Border Integrity.” 
http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/bi-if/index-eng.htm (January 20, 
2012). 
 
Santa-Cruz, Arturo. 2008. “National Security and Domestic 
Structures in North America: Comparing Two Trajectories.” 
Presented at the International Studies Association, San 
Francisco, March 26-29. 
 
Secretaría de Seguridad Pública. 2008.  Programa Nacional de 
Seguridad Pública 2008-2012, Mexico. 
 
Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The 
Social Construction of Power Politics.” International 
Organization 46 (2): 391-425.  
Roberto Domínguez and Rafael Velázquez 
19 
 
 
White House. 2010. National Security Strategy. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/na
tional_security_strategy.pdf (February 23, 2012) 
 
White House. 2011. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized 
Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy_to_C
ombat_Transnational_Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf (July 23, 
2011). 
 
